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The Eurozone crisis has created huge volatility in the market for government bonds, with the heavily
indebted countries on the Eurozone’s periphery facing significantly higher rates. One side effect of
this volatility, writes Jens Boysen-Hogrefe, is that Germany has been seen as a “safe haven“ for
those who wish to invest in government debt, leading to unusually low yields for government bonds.
He finds that these low yields have saved the German government over €80 billion in the past five
years.
Yields for German government bonds reached record lows in recent months. The downturn in yields
has now lasted since the start of the Great Recession, apart from a short disruption in the first half of
2011, and this has affected bills and bonds over all maturities (as shown in Figure 1 below). Papers with short
maturities have partly reached negative yields. Having these low yields for such a long time have made a sizable
relief for the public budget in Germany. This relief has been especially pronounced for the federal government which
is responsible for roughly one half of Germany’s public debt. The gains of the federal government may be especially
pronounced, since the bonds that they hold may function as a “safe haven” in Europe’s debt crisis. Other German
public debtors, like the Länder and communities, are benefiting from low yields, too, but to a somewhat smaller
extent.
Figure 1: Yield Curve for German Federal Government Bonds
Source: Thomsen Reuters Datastream.
Quantifying the level of relief for the federal government from these lower rates is only possible with some strict
assumptions, since bond yields depend on several impact factors. However, one may argue that the ten years
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before the crisis were rather “normal” with respect to interest rates and business cycle movements. Accordingly, the
mean interest rates from that period can be used as a benchmark. A calculation for all bills and bonds that have
been issued since 2009 shows that current interest payments in 2012 were lower by roughly €10 billion than in the
benchmark scenario (in the benchmark scenario bills and bonds accrue interest according to their mean interest
rates from 1999-2008). It can be expected that the relief for the federal budget will increase to €13 billion this year.
Summing up all the gains that are due to lower interest rates for federal government bonds and bills issued between
2009 and 2013, gives the sizable figure of roughly €80 billion.
The decline of bond yields is mainly driven by the low business cycle dynamics in the euro area and the interest rate
policy of the European Central Bank (it can be assumed that bond markets in the euro area are highly integrated
and therefore German bond yields should depend on euro area macro data). A model that mimics bond yields in the
years 1999-2008 and that controls for business cycle conditions and for ECB interest rates also shows a substantial
drop in bond yields during the Great Recession and the debt crisis. However, since 2011 actual bond yields and
those predicted by the model differ remarkably. This difference can be interpreted as the gains that the German
federal government has experienced due to the “safe haven” effect. They would presumably not exist if other
countries were not in trouble. The same calculation as above but with interest rates stemming from the model
instead of historical mean values shows that almost €2 billion €10 billion interest reduction in 2012 has been due to
the “safe haven” effect. In 2013 the corresponding figure increases to roughly €3 billion.
Interestingly, the result of the model also fits French bond yields in recent years. Note that French and German bond
yields were almost identical before 2008. It seems that the relation between French bond yields and euro area
macro data has been changed by neither the Great Recession nor the debt crisis. This means that there is no
particular additional risk premium, as is the case for Italy, and no “safe haven” effect like for Germany, as can be
seen in Figure 2. The comparison between French and German bond yields show that the “safe haven” effect
increased during 2011 when rumors about a break–up of the euro area became more intense. Finally, close to the
announcement of the open market transactions program by the ECB, spreads between French and German bonds
shrank but did not vanish. The French budget is benefiting from low bond yields, too, but without the “safe haven”
effects that Germany currently enjoys.
Figure 2: Bond yields (5 years maturity)
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Source: Thomsen Reuters Datastream
The overall-effect on the public budget in Germany will further grow in the coming years. The ECB has just lowered
its main interest rates (to 0.5 per cent), which are also relevant for the pricing of bonds, and there are still several
billions worth of federal government bonds with maturities of five to thirty years that were issued before the current
low yield period and that will soon be replaced. An overall benefit of more than €100 billion may be the case. (Note
that these figures do not include effects that are due to debt that is hold by the Länder and communities. Both have
benefited from lower interest rates in recent years, too, but not at the same scale as the federal government.)
However, sooner or later the turnaround in bond yields will come. Thus, the gains from these low interest rates
should not be taken as a signal to boost public debt in Germany. These gains are one-offs, rather than a structural
improvement of the budget. Accordingly, the current excellent German budget figures should be interpreted with
some care.
From a European perspective, it might be argued that these remarkable one-offs are benefits that the German
government have experienced due to the debt crisis and that it would be reasonable to spend this amount for
support of those countries in the euro area that are most affected by the debt crisis. However, one might also argue
that only those benefits should be counted that are due to the “safe haven” effect since countries like France are
benefiting from effects that are due to the ECB policy as well. The “safe haven” effect is only a fractional amount
and is comparatively low given the financial needs of the distressed countries. Finally, benefits due to low
government bond yields should not be the basis to calculate the commitment Germany is willing to make in the debt
crisis.
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